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Abstract. One can hypothesise about the autonomy of the political field in 
a complex society. To give an empirical dimension to this hypothesis, the 
author researches the resources mobilised by the candidates in 
parliamentary elections in the administrative department of Diyarbakır 
(Turkey) from 1920 to 2002. Four non-political resources can be mobilised 
(charisma, agrarian clientele and social capital resulting from a profession 
or family.) Furthermore, political resources are defined as the support of 
the party. After a statistical analysis, we find that the resources mobilised 
are changing in consideration of three factors. Firstly, the socio-economical 
changes (urbanisation, mechanisation of agriculture, etc.); secondly, the 
political party which plays a central role in the creation and transformation 
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The increasing complexity of societies is reflected in the autonomy of social fields1. The 
closure of the field is defined notably through the existence of separate institutions: its ability to create 
norms and its own stakes2. However, though the make-up of fields has been described in numerous 
instances, the autonomy of a field – above all its fluctuations – is difficult to pinpoint from an empirical 
standpoint. In order to do this, here we consider the example of a political field and we centre our 
analysis on one of the dimensions of this autonomy: the question of resources mobilised by the 
actors. In the case of the political field – of interest to us here –the term resources applies to what an 
individual may mobilise, for instance in order to be elected: militancy, religious charisma, social 
capital, etc.3 One of the dimensions of the autonomy of a field stems from the mobilisation of 
resources outside of the field in question, through complex and costly procedures, forming a veritable 
process of transformation. In the same way, the capacity of actors (individuals, institutions) to 
produce their own resources (activism, ideological discourse, etc.) is an indicator of autonomy. The 
process of transforming resources therefore allows an appreciation of the varying autonomy arising 
from the level of transformation of resources and from the ability of political actors to create their own 
resources. In comparison, an approach taken from biographical traits (age, qualification, gender, 
profession, etc.) enabling a description of how the position of an actor leads to an expression of 
certain consistencies between the field or the multiple standpoints, but which leaves largely 
unexplored the question of what circulates (and what is transformed) from one field to another. 
[2] In order to test these hypotheses, we examine the resources mobilised for the election of 
deputies in the republican period (1920-2002) for the administrative department (il) of Diyarbakır in 
                                                 
1 We seek to distinguish here a concept of field which explains the regular and sometimes competing 
interactions between the actors (Bourdieu 1992), from the larger notion of sector – which in the Weberian 
tradition refers to all-encompassing activities (economic, religious, political, aesthetic, intellectual etc.), and 
whose definition rests upon conceptual categories. In this way, it is difficult to speak of a political field, and we 
prefer the concept of a political sector. On the other hand, the concept of field can apply to regular interactions 
involving defined stakes – for instance, an election. 
2 The information necessary for this research, in particular biographies, was collected during a number of 
different visits in Diyarbakır, principally in May and July 2005. I thank all those who agreed to answer our 
questions, especially the AKP and the DEHAP members, as well as Mehmeti Aktoprak for his informed advice. 
We would also like to thank Benoit Fliche, Olivier Grojean, Elise Massicard, Clémence Scalbert and Alexandre 
Toumarkine for reading a draft version of this paper and Delphine Hery for producing all the graphs. 
3 If we follow Sewell (Sewell 1992) who comments on Giddens: the resources are all that can produce or 
reproduce power (unequally shared). The rules produce the resources (the way in which they can be used in a 
given social context), and also the rules without resources disappear. The dynamics of social systems stem in 
particular from the fact that the rules are numerous, contradictory, which the actors use in a creative manner. 
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South-Eastern Turkey4. Why favour an analysis on a departmental scale in this study? Firstly, this 
framework represents a consistent electoral constituency since the beginning of the Republic and 
therefore defines the principal field for electoral competition. Therefore, the value of resources can be 
appreciated much more easily in the context of a competition. The construction of resources at the 
national level a priori suggests a consistency of mobilised resources throughout all the administrative 
departments, a theory which this paper resolutely rejects. 
[3] Secondly, research into resources does not allow for the direct use of existing sources 
because these only give a general indication of social position. Thus, the resources, which a 
posteriori give the greatest indication of the longevity of a deputy are not included in the official 
categories, often because they concern aspects considered to be private or illicit. Furthermore, the 
data collected nation-wide in year books - the biographies of the TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 
Large National Assembly of Turkey) for instance – are incomplete, if not sometimes incorrect, from 
where the necessity arises to fill in the gaps using other sources, including interviews or local history 
– a task most easily achieved in the context of an administrative department, especially over an 
extended period. 
[4] We now present in more detail the administrative department we have selected. In its 
political behaviour (vote, partisan structure), the administrative department of Diyarbakır5 is not 
representative of such an average, but on the other hand is unique in many other aspects. Diyarbakır 
belongs to a group of regional departments whose population is largely Kurdish, and who have a 
specific political orientation. A study of the administrative department of Diyarbakır will enable us to 
look beyond certain stereotypes, sometimes orientalist, concerning the workings of local politics. In 
particular, tribal and brotherhood associations are explicitly or implicitly the basis of many political 
analyses, including local actors, who advocate a strong link between these solidarities and political 
behaviour. If, in effect, about 20 deputies out of the 163 elected between 1920 and 2002 belonged to 
                                                 
4 In the absence of any indication to the contrary, ‘Diyarbakır’ means the administrative department region (il) 
and not the city.  
5 The administrative department of Diyarbakır has, for much of the time, consisted of a single constituency 
whose boundaries have varied principally because of the creation of the Batman administrative department. 
The department is divided into districts (ilçe) - Merkez, Bismil, Çermik, Çinar, Çüngüs, Dicle, Eğil, Ergani, Hani, 
Hazro, Kocaköy, Kulp, Lice and Silvan.  
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a family of şeyh6, we will see that, mainly after 1980, their involvement in politics evokes more 
complex mechanisms than the simple mobilisation of their followers. Moreover, apart from the 
administrative department of Hakkari for example, no deputy has built up his electoral support 
essentially from a clan or tribal type group. 
[5] The administrative department in fact is characterised by a growing politicisation – notably 
in the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when exactly the opposite was happening in the rest of Turkey. 
After 1980, the electoral results reflect the subtle differences as regards the national standard with 
the marginalisation of numerous national parties and the decisive grip of Kurdish parties7. The 
electoral volatility in Diyarbakır was less strong than in the rest of the country since the end of the 
1980s, because the Kurdish movement was dominant with more than 45% of votes in 1995 and 
1999, and 56% in 2002. As opposed to the rest of Turkey the elections of 2002 did not constitute a 
splits, la penetration of the AKP remained limited, and the extremely popular Genç Parti (Young 
Party), whose national level of penetration used to be a good indicator of political crisis, had a 
negligible result (Dorronsoro et al. 2003).  
[6] Furthermore, the administrative department was not politically homogenous. The reasons 
for sub-departmental specificities are complex, and in part a consequence of the uprising in the 
1920s and 1930s (Bruinessen 1999, Bozarslan 1997). Later on, the formation of radical Kurdish 
groups in the 1960s often occurred in the districts (ilçe) which were home to high school or 
institutions for higher education. Moreover, even if the dominant population of Kurds means that 
ethnic origin is not a deciding stake, the non-Kurdish population often have a specific political 
behaviour. The Turkish-speaking population present in the west of the administrative department (ilçe 
of Çermik), settling there from the 1960s as a result of dam construction, do not vote for Kurdist 
parties8, as is also the case for a significant number of members of the military, as well as civil 
servants with regional origins other than the south-east. The scenario is therefore very different to 
                                                 
6 A charismatic personality associated principally with a Sufi order who takes charge of the mürid (disciples) in 
their mystic initiation. 
7 By ‘Kurdist’ we mean a party explicitly mobilising the Kurdish identity through politics. 
8 The DEHAP obtained only 22.2% of the vote in this district in 2002 as compared against an administrative 
departmental average of 56.1%. The Turks from Bulgaria had settled in the ilçe of Çüngüs in the 19th Century. 
Moreover, several thousand Türkmen had settled in Bismil, but were gradually ‘kurdified’ linguistically and 
culturally. Similarly, the non-Kurdish population present in the city of Diyarbakır (Arabs, Turks) do not seem to 
vote in a very identifiable manner. 
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that in Urfa or Erzurum – administrative departments polarised by a religious or ethnic split. In the 
administrative department of Diyarbakır, the difference between speakers of zazaki and of kurmanji 
(two Kurdish dialects) do not constitute a framework for political mobilisation in recent times. A very 
large portion of the population being Chafeite Sunni, the religious split no longer plays a role.  
[7] In choosing to consider the entire Republican period, we do not assume that there is 
similarity between elections from the single-party to the multiparty periods. On the other hand, the 
different institutional divides are of a key importance and provide the reason as to why the 
comparison between these four periods [1920-1946], [1950-1957], [1961-1977] and [1983-2002] is 
central to our examination into the autonomy of the political field. Only five deputies were elected in 
two different periods, demonstrating a renewal of practically the entire political personnel and 
likewise, the mobilised resources are noticeably different from one period to another. Whilst the name 
of a party such as the CHP can remain constant from one period to another, the political agenda and 
the organisational framework changes sufficiently for us to consider that the party is different. On the 
contrary, we suppose there is continuity in the Islamic (RF/FP) and Kurdish (DEP/HADEP/DEHAP) 
movements. We point out here that we do not consider the 1971 coup to be divisive. As opposed to 
the 1960 and 1980 coups, the 1971 coup did not result in as much of a visible split, possibly due to 
the fact that, allowing for exceptions, political parties were not prohibited.  
[8] In order to analyse the resources employed in the political field during the election of 
deputies, we will undertake a four-stage process. Firstly, the different resources will be explained 
analytically, and we will see how their mobilisation makes re-election more or less likely. Secondly, by 
using social transformations taken from outside the political field (mechanisation of agriculture, 
urbanisation etc.), we will take into account the mobilisation, varying over time, of certain resources 
by those elected. These causal links have a genuine though incomplete explanatory value, which is 
why it is necessary to then turn towards explanations from within the political field. On one hand, the 
political parties play a central role in the transformation of non-political resources and in producing 
partisan resources. On the other hand, institutional splits – coups, the introduction of a multiparty 
system or the evolution of electoral laws – have a major impact on the resources enabling the 
election of deputies. 
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I. The mobilised resources 
[9] The resources are valuable at two decisive moments in the political career of the future 
deputy: at the time the candidate is chosen by the party and during the mobilisation of voters (the 
same resource being effective principally towards the voters or the party, a point which we shall 
return to). We must however distinguish non-partisan resources from partisan resources. For 
Diyarbakır, four non-partisan resources were employed in politics: the influence arising through land 
ownership, religious charisma attributed to belonging to a şeyh family, the social capital linked with 
certain professions and the notoriety of an ‘aristocratic-like’ family (eşraf). The support of a political 
party – through activism, a special relationship with the leader, etc. – makes up the final resource 
which can be mobilised, mainly for the purposes of nomination of candidates. We do not claim to give 
a complete picture of all the resources – for instance, we could add oratorical ability or financial 
capital. Instead we present only a selection of the most significant resources for this particular area 
(see the annexe on methodology). More generally, the resources can be combined and evolve over 
time, especially for politicians who have long careers (Lacam 1998). After first giving an analytical 
presentation of these resources, we will then investigate their combination and their transformation. 
 
Five resources 
[10] The practice of a rare and socially valued profession gives rise to the constitution of a 
social capital, which in turn can constitute a political resource. In our department, lawyers and doctors 
account for 35% of those elected following the introduction of a multiparty system in 1950 - out of 114 
deputies 23 were lawyers (22%) and 17 doctors (13%) -, nevertheless only 20% (17 lawyers and 12 
doctors) possess a social capital linked to their reputation (see the annexe on methodology). 
Between 1950 and 1977, 24 out of 61 deputies (39 %) were doctors or lawyers, a proportion, which 
clearly declined thereafter. Because they place individuals in a compromising situation, certain 
situations favour the self-referral to an expert - a form of delegation affecting sometimes very private 
matters. How does this particular social capital become a political resource? A central theme, present 
simultaneously for those in the professions as well as the profession of deputy, at least as far as 
defined by most citizens, is that of service (hizmet) – which facilitates the change to political 
representation. Furthermore, lawyers, through their professions, are drawn into representing 
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prominent citizens, and significant groups, particularly against the State. The last point to be 
underlined is the prestige given to education in a society largely illiterate until the 1960s9. 
Table 1: resources mobilised by the deputies for their election in the administrative 
department of Diyarbakır (1920-2002) 
 










































19208   0.00   0.00 4 0.5 0 0 2 0.25   0.00   0.00 6 0.75 
19235 2 0.40 2 0.40 5 1 0 0 4 0.80   0.00   0.00 9 1.80 
19274 1 0.25 1 0.25 1 0.25 0 0 1 0.25   0.00   0.00 2 0.50 
19314 3 0.75 3 0.75 2 0.5 0 0 1 0.25   0.00   0.00 3 0.75 
19358 4 0.50 4 0.50 4 0.5 0 0 3 0.38   0.00   0.00 7 0.88 
19397 4 0.57 4 0.57 4 0.571 0 0 2 0.29   0.00   0.00 6 0.86 
19436 3 0.50 4 0.67 5 0.833 0 0 4 0.67   0.00   0.00 9 1.50 
19467 2 0.29 3 0.43 7 1 0 0 5 0.71   0.00   0.00 12 1.71 
19507 0 0.00 0 0.00 5 0.714 1 0.14 4 0.57 1 0.14 4 0.57 14 2.00 
19548 2 0.25 3 0.38 4 0.5 1 0.13 5 0.63 6 0.75 3 0.38 13 1.63 
19578 4 0.50 6 0.75 2 0.25 0 0 1 0.13 6 0.75 3 0.38 6 0.75 
19619 0 0.00 1 0.11 5 0.556 1 0.11 5 0.56 2 0.22 4 0.44 15 1.67 
19658 2 0.25 3 0.38 5 0.625 1 0.13 4 0.50 4 0.50 4 0.50 14 1.75 
19697 2 0.29 2 0.29 4 0.571 2 0.29 5 0.71 4 0.57 3 0.43 14 1.75 
19737 2 0.29 3 0.43 3 0.429 2 0.29 5 0.71 5 0.71 2 0.29 12 1.71 
19777 3 0.43 3 0.43 3 0.429 2 0.29 3 0.43 5 0.71 1 0.14 9 1.29 
19837 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 0.286 0 0 1 0.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 0.43 
19878 0 0.00 1 0.13 2 0.25 1 0.13 2 0.25 5 0.63 1 0.13 6 0.75 
19918 2 0.25 4 0.50 0 0 1 0.13 1 0.13 8 1.00 1 0.13 3 0.38 
199510 2 0.20 4 0.40 1 0.1 4 0.4 2 0.20 6 0.60 1 0.10 8 0.80 
199911 6 0.55 7 0.64 0 0 5 0.45 1 0.09 10 0.91 1 0.09 7 0.64 
200210 1 0.10 2 0.20 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.10 10 1.00 1 0.10 4 0.40 
[11] In certain conditions property holdings can provide the basis for political influence. Under 
the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish administrative regions experienced a complex regime with districts 
(sancak) of differing status, which left an important autonomy to the exercise of local power 
(Bruinessen 1991, Akçay 1988: 10). After 1826 and the disappearance of the timar system, individual 
proprietorship of land became widespread and – although a law of 1858 in principal prohibited the 
ownership of villages – the landed gentry, the nomadic tribal leaders and the şeyh appropriated a 
large part of the land. The republican regime, far from providing a break with this system, would 
                                                 
9 The 1970 general census is indicating that 29,3% of the population of Diyarbakır is literate. 
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legalise land occupation (1926) and rejected all redistribution. Moreover, if the concentration of land 
led the military to banish 55 ağa (large landowners) from the Kurdish regions following the 1960 
coup, and to call for agrarian reform, these landowners were ultimately permitted to return after 1961 
and retain all their property (Mac Dowall 1996: 400). 
[12] The administrative department of Diyarbakır represents the largest concentration large-
scale property holdings in the Kurdish regions: 52 proprietors possess more than 500 hectares. In the 
1960s, out of 663 villages in the Diyarbakır administrative department, 476 were dominated by small-
holdings, 27 belonged to families and 31 to the sülâle (large families) (Akçay 1988: 13)10. The 
exploitation of land capital establishes economic circular flows, which are also the interplay of 
complex exchanges – notably bridging loans. The transformation of land capital into social influence 
is largely the product of a mobilisation process, which brings about a differentiation of the social role 
of the ağa from simple property ownership. As regards land ownership structures similar at the 
outset, practices can vary considerably, particularly in line with the presence or absenteeism of the 
proprietor. The tenant farmers and more widely, the people dependant on property holdings 
constitute an easily mobilised support for elections as can be seen from  the  numerous descriptions 
of the role of the ağa (Bozarslan 1966). 
[13] The social capital linked to a family possessing the title of eşraf supports itself through 
specific practices of sociability, which we find in the sometimes romanticised descriptions in historical 
literature and autobiographical accounts11. Historically the eşraf are the upper middle class in the city 
of Diyarbakır, senior civil servants of the Ottoman Empire, generally large absentee landowners, 
possessing strong cultural capital (the best high schools in Istanbul, and foreign universities), 
diversifying of their own economic capital from the 1930s in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the 
economy (industry, banking, etc.). In certain cases, family history, for instance an opposition to the 
Kemalist regime, which can be seen through exile or a confiscation of land, represents 
trustworthiness – further capital for a populace who are for the most part distrustful of Ankara.  
                                                 
10 Nevertheless, at a sub-departmental level, there are marked differences between the districts: large 
landowners towards Bismil and Silvan, small properties in the mountainous regions in the north, Dicle or 
Çüngüs. 
11 Descendants (in theory) of the Prophet through Hasan and Husayn, which gave rise to tax, legal and 
clothing privileges. (Schatkowski-Schilcher 1985: 124-125). Nevertheless, though equivalent to the title of 
ayan, this title has lost its religious dimension and refers to the bourgeoisie – socially rising since the 18th 
century (Karpart 1973). 
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[14] If no şeyh in the precise meaning of the term has been elected a deputy some deputies 
belong to a family which benefits from a hereditary charisma. The deputies connected by this 
hereditary charisma have an influential ability as regards those voters who are mürid (disciples) of the 
şeyh. For example, the Ensarioğlu family, descendants of the şeyh Said12, settled in Dicle, initially 
within the Zaza tribes. Ensarioğlu Kal Masa – who was the father of Abdülatif Ensarioğlu and the 
grandfather of Salim Ensarioğlu (both deputies) – had a reputation of holiness. This enabled his 
descendants to maintain an influence in the village of Yeşilsirt (Kal Musa), at Pekmezciler in the 
south of the Dicle district, as well as in the Kocaköy Merkez district, where şeyh Abdulrezzak (the son 
of Ensarioğlu Kal Masa) had lived for two years. The figures aptly show a specific electoral 
mobilisation. Thus, in a context nevertheless marked by the decline of the DYP (7.2% for the 
administrative department), the villages and the smaller market towns (as compared to the urban 
centres) of the Dicle district in 2002 give more than 33.3% of their votes to Abdülatif Ensarioğlu, a 
candidate of this party (DIE 2002: 8). 
[15] The partisan resources are defined here in relation to the party, which we can pinpoint in 
the biographies by the length of membership to the party, the proximity to the leader, the presence of 
a deputy in the immediate family, the participation in associations close to politics – for example the 
MTTB (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) anti-communist and very much right-wing, or the DDKD (Devrimci 
Demokratik Kültür Derneği) a melting pot of Kurdish nationalism, etc. Two typical cases are 
distinguished here. Some deputies have a strong educational capital, a place of residence outside 
the administrative department and support close to the directorate of the party, which fixes their local 
candidature, for instance Hikmet Çetin13. More rarely, others, build up a local activist base which 
enables them to impose their candidature on the party directorate, amongst the few examples the 
deputy of the TİP14.  
 
                                                 
12 The leader of the 1925 Kurdish revolt (Bruinessen 1991). 
13 Hikmet Çetin, senior civil servant in economic planning and director of the CHP, then of the SHP. Elected for 
Istanbul then for Gaziantep, member of the Ecevit government in 1977. 
14 Tarik Ziya Ekinci, doctor and a former activist of the CHP, established a TİP cell at Diyarbakır. Moreover he 
was deputy party secretary. Elected deputy of TİP in 1965 after a preliminary election within the activists. 
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The combination of resources 
[16] A given individual can of course draw upon some resources simultaneously. What 
exactly are the statistical links between them? If we consider the essentially hereditary resources 
(charisma, property, family notoriety), the most frequent link is between the mobilisation of property 
resources and family notoriety. Both resources overlap in part, which is logical since initially the 
biggest property holdings belonged to the bourgeoisie class, who were very integrated within the 
machinery of the State. Out of the 62 deputies mobilising property resources, 50 (80%) also 
mobilised family notoriety and out of the 69 possessing family notoriety 50 (74%) also owned 
property resources. In other respects, the mobilisation of a charismatic resource is linked to the 
mobilisation of property holdings (68%), but there is less connection with family notoriety 
(approximately a third).  





combination of 3 
resources 




- 24% 12% 
charisma 36% 68% - 36% 
Note: the first line of the table reads as follows: out of the deputies enjoying family notoriety, 21% do 
not have another resource, 74% also have a property resource, 11% combine family notoriety and 
charismatic resources. 11% combine the three resources. 
[17] The deputies mobilising a professional reputation (lawyers and doctors) combine 
different resources over different time periods. Between 1950 and 1969, out of 21 deputies mobilising 
their professional reputation, 15 also have a hereditary resource. After 1969, only 2 out of the 8 
deputies mobilising a professional reputation also mobilise a hereditary resource. We therefore have 
the emergence of a new generation, which does not combine as many resources. Out of 33 deputies 
mobilising partisan resources, between 1950 and 1977, 14 did not possess a hereditary resource. 
After 1980, out of 39 deputies with partisan resources, 25 did not have a hereditary resource. As 
before, we observe a lesser association with other resources. 
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[18] More generally, we note a decrease in the average number of non-partisan resources 
per deputy in the long run (see table 1). Furthermore, the partisan resources become progressively 
dominant and are not associated with others, whilst the principally hereditary resources accumulate 
almost systematically, giving rise to circular flows for the transformation of resources. We may 
consider there to be a movement of political autonomy over several decades, as the non-partisan 
resources carry less influence. Similarly, between 1983 and 2002, out of 40 elected representatives, 
18 had been nominated by the party central management and were without a local presence. If we 
make the comparison between the different periods, we observe that there is an increasing influence 
from the centre on the selection of candidates. As a consequence, we may speak of a nationalisation 
of local politics. 
 
The transformation of resources 
[19] It would be incorrect to consider resources as stock – the biographical career paths 
being on the contrary other hand able to be interpreted as a transformation of resources. Put 
differently, the initial resources, mobilised at the time of the first election evolve, which evokes a 
strictly strategic dimension in the behaviour of the deputies. A long career enables a diversification of 
resources, a cultivation of partisan and even economic resources in certain cases.  
[20] We have not noted the change of activity, which can be attributed to being a deputy, but 
in certain cases a personal enrichment is very likely, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. On the 
other hand, being a deputy is the opportunity to start a new career in Istanbul or in Ankara, out of the 
networks constituted at the time of election. A proportion of the deputies seem to move into new 
areas of employment, mainly in Ankara or in Istanbul, for instance by opening a law firm or in working 
in the town council, a vakıf etc.  
 
The re-elected and their resources 
[21] Having described the mobilisation of certain resources, it is necessary to enquire into 
their effectiveness. We receive an indication from the fact that very few of the candidates do not 
mobilise any of the described resources (see the methodological annexe). The mobilised resources 
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are more significant in certain social contexts, which is confirmed by the results (infra §39). 
Furthermore, some resources facilitate not only the entry, but also the continuance of political life. If 
we take the period of 1961-77, we note for instance that a deputy having a charismatic resource can 
expect 2.6 mandates as compared with 1.3 mandates in the absence of resources (see table 3). 
Furthermore, we note that these figures fluctuates over time, thus a deputy with property resources 
achieves an average of 2.2 mandates during the single party period, 1.4 between 1950 and 1957, 
then 1.8 between 1961 and 1977. 
Table 3: re-elections and resources of deputies 
 1920-46 1950-57 1961-77 1980-2002 
charisma - 2 (only one case) 2.6 2 
property 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.6 
family notoriety 2.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 
political resources - 1.4 1.5 1.5 
professional 
reputation 
- 1.3 1.4 1.6 
average number of 
mandates for the 
deputies of the 
administrative 
department15 
1.8  1.4 1.4 1.3 
 
II The evolution of non-partisan resources 
[22] Socio-economic progression, notably urbanisation and the mechanisation of agriculture, 
have an important impact on the value of non-partisan resources.  
 
Professional reputation 
[23] Doctors and lawyers were rare in the administrative department of Diyarbakır before the 
1970s, and were therefore in a prominent position. Their subsequent multiplication made this 
automatic position of notability disappear, above all in a city like Diyarbakır with a million inhabitants 
at the end of the century. The deputies-doctors practically disappeared after 1980 with only a single 
case where there are significant effects of patronage. On the other hand, the deputies-lawyers 
                                                 
15 Out of 163 deputies since 1920, 73 had only a single mandate, 20 had two, 8 had three and 4 had four. 
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remain strongly present. Professional reputation, from then on marginal, does not provide any greater 
explanation, though the specific socialisation of this medium does. In effect, legal practice was a 
place for politicisation from the 1960s. For example, a very large proportion of CHP candidates and 
cadres were lawyers in this period. In the 1970s CHP and the 1990s Kurdist parties, lawyers 
represented an important proportion of managers. Those entitled to practice law in Diyarbakır have a 
strong tradition of investing in left-wing and Kurdist parties, as do many professional associations 
which play a role in social mobilisation (Bora 2000, Dorronsoro 2005). According to various interviews 
which we carried out between 2002 and 2005 with Kurdist activist students at the beginning of the 
1990s, the choice of the profession of lawyer would have been partly motivated by this political 
engagement. 




The disappearance of ‘property’ and ‘family notoriety’ resources 
[24] Progressive urbanisation considerably changes the political game by lessening the 
relative weight of the country people in the elections. Additionally, the socio-economic 
transformations brought about by the mechanisation of agriculture results in a growing cost of 
transforming a property holding into political influence. The agricultural mechanisation occurs is on an 
increasing scale from 1950, when numbers of tractors are imported following the Marshall plan. In 
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1948, in Turkey, we count 1,750 tractors, their number exceeding 10,000 in 1951 and 40,000 in 1954, 
which has the effect of accelerating the concentration of land. This evolution is particularly strong in 
the south-east, where the small farmers saw themselves compelled into renting tractors in return for a 
portion of the harvest, and indeed even into sell their land and become agricultural labourers. At the 
beginning of the 1960s, unemployment was very strong in the winter months: 80% in January as 
compared with 10% in July, and these seasonal variations increasingly affected a population of 
proletariat agricultural workers (Mac Dowall 1996: 399, Bozarslan 1966). In Diyarbakır, the tenant 
farmers were turned into labourers looking after the livestock and taking part in seasonal work. These 
workers coexisted alongside the capitalist farmers in the same villages. 
[25] The mechanisation and the concentration of the land in the 1960s therefore made the 
traditional circular flows disappear (Anderson 1978). That said, certain ağa maintained employment 
for the tenant farmers accepting the additional economic cost, in order to avoid direct confrontation 
with them or to preserve political influence. In a study, Akçay shows how, in the village of Sinan 
(between Bismil and Batman), the landowner adopted a strictly capitalist approach which alienated 
him from the local populace (and prohibited him from all politically significant roles) (Akçay 1998). 
Conversely, at Silvan, a large landowner introduced paternalist vote-catching which represented a 
considerable financial investment.  
[26] Although eşraf and ağa often go hand in hand, we note a different evolution for each of 
them. If some eşraf no longer had large property holdings, their disappearance allowed for the 
intervention of mechanisms other than the loss of rural supporters. In actual fact, we observe the 
abandonment of the eşraf from the 1960s and these have almost completely disappeared today. The 
diversification of capital is a general phenomenon which is found from the instant when capital 
invested in land has a less substantial return and as the opportunity to invest in industry and services 
increases. In the south-east, savings do not finance local investment, but benefit the most developed 
regions of the west (Diken 2000), moreover there had not been a State policy of significant 
redistribution in favour of the region. Thus, the bourgeoisie profit from governmental non-interest 
bearing loans in order to invest in industry or services, outside of their region of origin. The 
displacement of the economical interests of these families leads to the displacement of their places of 
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residence into the big cities such as Ankara and Istanbul, and this accelerated after 1980 when 
security deteriorated.  
 





[27] The weakening of the Sufi networks is particularly clear in urban areas, where however 
there is a proliferation of practices orientated towards healing. The active şeyh in the administrative 
department have less and less of the mürid and, in the towns, the zikr (mystic reunions) concerning, above 
all the newcomers to the village. Furthermore, the medrese (Islamic schools, illegal after their closure in the 1920s) as 
opposed to the imam-hatip schools no longer have any pupils. Against this backdrop, hereditary and 
family religious charisma is a declining source of mobilisation as is in fact shown, for example, when 
certain villages which traditionally voted a deputy from a şeyh family, vote for Kurdish candidates 
from the mid-1990s. Let us take the example of an independent application to stand of Abdülmelik 
Fırat16, in 2002 at Diyarbakır. He was elected in the 1950s from a list of DP candidates at Hınıs 
without having to campaign. In 2002, he put himself forward employing the sole means of his 
                                                 
16 Grandson of the şeyh Said, elected without having campaigned at Hınıs in the 1950s from a list of DP. 
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charisma, since his party is an organisation lacking in financial means. He suffers a serious setback, 
confirming the difficulty to mobilise on the basis of his only charismatic resources. Despite the 
presence of şeyh, at the administrative department’s level, the votes for the DYP are lower than the 
national average. These residual supporters cannot win an election at the departmental level.  
[28] On the contrary, the Nurcu movements, moreover ideologically variably orientated, were 
very much developed. That of the Fettulahcı brought together several thousand people in the 
administrative department, above all in the central district (Merkez). The Yeni Asya followers, mainly 
established in the town of Diyarbakır, similarly united several thousand people. Lastly, the Med Zehra 
movement emerges in the 1980s. As opposed to the two former movements, it is linked to the 
medrese – the traditional place for the dissemination of Kurdish culture – and ideologically close to 
the Kurdish parties17.  
[29] The şeyh themselves seldom have an open political position, whilst the religious 
societies (cemaat) have coherent political position-taking at a national level and their instructions are 
reputed to have real influence on results. In general, Med Zehra supports the Kurdish parties, Yeni 
Asya the DYP and the Fettulahcı the RF/FP/AKP. The mobilisation occurs mainly during their 
meetings (with a large audience), where the leader of the cemaat announces his vote. The 
negotiations between cemaat and political parties takes places largely at a national level18. The graph 
bears testament to the absence of a relationship between the transformation of religious practices 
mentioned above and the growing presence of this resource amongst the deputies in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
                                                 
17 İzzetin Yıldırım, the founder of the movement, born in 1946 at Ağrı, had established the Med Zehra Vakfı in 
Istanbul which published the magazine Yeni Zemin. This Nurcu movement, as a reaction against the Turkish 
nationalist tendencies within the Nurcu organisations, oversaw the translation of Risale (the fundamental work 
of Said Nursi) into Kurdish and established student hostels at Diyarbakır, Van, Eskişehir, Konya, etc. which 
would be closed by the government after 1997. İzzetin Yıldırım was killed by the end of 1999 by the Hizbullah 
(İlim) (interviews at DYB). 
18 A deputy can for example intervene in order to obtain a favourable price for a cemaat which buys land from 
the Treasury. 
Citation: Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) 'The autonomy of the political field. The resources of the Deputies of Diyarbakır 
(Turkey): 1920-2002', European Journal of Turkish Studies, Thematic Issue N°3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, 
URL : http://www.ejts.org/document477.html 
To quote a passage, use paragraph (§). 
Graph 3: percentage of deputies mobilising a charismatic resource 
 
The limits of the socio-economic explanations 
[30] These socio-economic changes account for certain evolutions such as the presence of 
resources associated with professional notoriety and family reputation or with property resources. 
However in some cases, there exists a significant temporal discrepancy: property resources are 
heavily represented in the 1960s and 1970s, while they are already in decline. Nevertheless, this 
presence can be justified by the establishment of a partisan capital for those who have been elected. 
Landowners do not return to the political field until after 1980 possibly because of insufficient 
resources or because the parties have changed.  
[31] However, why does the decline in brotherhood practices not result in a decrease in the 
presence of this resource, virtually non-existent before 1980 and much more represented thereon? 
More generally, why does this decline occur intermittently in relation to the socio-economic 
evolutions? This leads us now to consider the internal processes in the political spectrum. 
 
III The party and the transformation of resources  
[32] We will firstly discuss whether candidates are able to join and leave parties easily. Secondly, we 
will consider the links between the parties and their resources. 
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Are parties necessary to candidates? 
[33] To demonstrate the central role of parties, we will successively tackle the questions of 
independent elected representatives and of the change in parties. Votes for independent candidates 
are difficult to decipher for each candidate, as only global figures are generally available for analysis. 
There have only been two independent elected representatives: one in 1969 and another in 1977. 
These two deputies concurrently hold all hereditary resources, allowing them to mobilise enough 
voters. However, more than a chosen strategy, their independence is the result of the failure in 
negotiations with a party. Once elected, they rejoin a party19.  
[34] Concerning the changes of parties, we are excluding from our analysis forced changes 
resulting from dissolution or prohibition of a party - for example, when a deputy passes from the DP 
to the YTP, or from the YTP to the CHP. In all other cases, we have only been able to locate six 
changes of parties, small in comparison with the number of deputies and national tendencies (Turan 
in this special issue). Moreover it seems that deputies do not change party during the course of their 
mandate. Segregation is almost total between the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ (including Islamic parties). The 
change of parties takes place in an ideological compatible setting, for example between the ANAP 
and the RP/FP. The global image is that of an ideological, structured world, where parties hold a key 
role.   
 
Parties and resources 
[35] Parties are not neutral operators, they change their resources to suit their preferences. 
Several considerations intervene here, varying according to the party concerned: the choice of 
candidates, relations with the leader, involvement in militant networks, ideological similarities, 
reputation of the candidate, financial contribution for the campaign etc. A party is not a machine with 
a view to maximise the number of voters, but an organisation with several aims and practicalities. For 
example in 1969, İnönü, leader of the CHP party, puts forward a list of candidates all foreign to the 
                                                 
19 Note that in 1977, out of the 11 independent elected representatives of Parliament, 8 are Kurdish. The 
explanation for this lies in the conjunction of two phenomena: a rapid development of ideology – which is 
perhaps more true in the Kurdish regions than elsewhere in Turkey – and an ever strong capacity of 
mobilisation of resources linked with land. The politicization (to the left or Islamic) works against the 
nomination of the prominent citizens by the parties, though their resources still allow them to be elected.  
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administrative department, in an ideological perspective of exchange, even if this results in a total 
(and probably expected) failure in the elections. We will now analyse, for each time period, the 
distribution of resources between the parties. 
[36] In the period of one party (1920-1946), the appointment is made by Ankara, without 
consideration of electoral competition, but not necessarily without consideration of the capacity of the 
deputies to be the interface of government action. Two types of ideal can be distinguished from this 
period: on the one hand the eşraf and, on the other hand, those without local ties, chosen for their 
integration into the State. The variety of resources during this period can be explained by evolutions 
in government policy. In the first two terms of office, the centre chooses prominent citizens very well 
set up. These citizens vanish after the revolt of şeyh Said, when the government chooses 
representatives to support the policy of the administration. Therefore, in 1927 and in 1931, all 
deputies are senior civil servants who are not based in Diyarbakır. Progressively, these senior 
citizens return in force, this tendency is accelerated by the return to a multiparty system. In 1946, the 
seven deputies are eşraf or close to them. We are in a triangular system consisting of property 
resources, the upper echelons of the administration and the CHP (Arslan 1992: 56 sq.).  
[37] In the period of a multiparty system, certain parties favour political resources (DP, AKP, 
Kurdist parties, TİP in 1965). In particular, we witness the transformation of the DP, the dominant 
party between 1950 and 1957. This party begins by recruiting the eşraf, originating from families in 
exile in the 1930s, who were generally opposed to the republican government. Progressively, the DP 
puts forward those candidates with partisan resources (activism, exteriority in relation to the 
province), while the number of landowners decreases (see table 1). 
[38] Between 1961 and 1977, the political field being more complex, we will consider only the 
more important parties (AP, YTP, CHP) and three resources: property resources, professional 
reputation and political resources. Property resources are split between the AP and the YTP. 
Professional reputation is vital to the CHP and the YTP. The YTP has both of these resources, while 
the AP and the CHP seems to clearly oppose it. This seems to be consistent with the electoral results 
of the parties, the CHP doing the best in the cities, the AP in villages and market towns, the YTP 
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being in a median position20. Partisan resources become more common during the course of time 
because of re-elections and the appearance of parties with a strong activist structure like the TİP 
(communist) or the MSP (Islamic). 
Table 4: resources by term of office and by party (1961-77) 
1961 Number of deputies Property resources Political resources Professional reputation 
AP 1 0 1 0 
CHP 3 2 0 1 
YTP 3 3 1 3 
1965 Number of deputies Property resources Political resources Professional reputation 
AP 2 1 0 1 
CHP 2 1 1 2 
YTP 2 2 2 3 
1968-69Number of deputies Property resources Political resources Professional reputation 
AP 5 3 2 1 
CHP 2 0 0 2 
YTP 2 1 2 2 
1973 Number of deputies Property resources Political resources Professional reputation 
AP 2 2 1 0 
CHP 3 1 3 2 
1977 Number of deputies Property resources Political resources Professional reputation 
AP 2 2 2 0 
CHP 3 0 2 1 
 
                                                 
20 In this way, in the elections of 1969, the CHP gains 43% of votes in the cities, compared with 13% for the AP 
and 30% for the YTP, the TİP holds 50% of urban votes (figures calculated using the electoral statistics of the 
DİE). 
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Table 5: resources by party and by legislature (1961-77) 
AP 
No. 





1961 1 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 
1965 2 1 50% 0 0% 1 50% 
1969 5 3 60% 2 40% 1 20% 
1973 2 2 100% 1 50% 0 0% 
1977 2 2 100% 2 100% 0 0% 
CHP 
No. 





1961 3 2 67% 0 0% 1 33% 
1965 2 1 50% 1 50% 2 100% 
1969 2 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 
1973 3 1 33% 3 100% 2 67% 
1977 3 0 0% 2 67% 1 33% 
YTP 
No. 





1961 3 3 100% 1 33% 3 100% 
1965 2 2 100% 2 100% 3 0% 
1969 2 1 50% 2 100% 2 0% 
Note: the percentages turn on very reduced figures, variations of which are therefore only slightly 
significant. 
[39] Post 1980, the main resources are partisan, charisma and property. The parties 
concerned here are the ANAP, the CHP, the RP/FP, the SHP and the AKP. Property resources, 
much in decline, is present essentially within the ANAP and the DYP. Political resources are very 
present in the RP/FP, the SHP and in the AKP, which nominates activists unknown to the public. 
Political resources in other parties are linked with re-elections.  
[40] Charismatic resources are more interesting. The candidates split themselves between 
the ANAP, the DYP and the RP/FP. In the 1980s and 1990s, we note a veritable competition 
between the parties of the centre-right and the Islamic parties for resources linked to religion (for 
example the qualities of belonging to a charismatic family, being müftü, or an imam-hatip schooling 
background). However, the principally rural bases of these means that their selection is not very 
favourable for the party in the medium term given the context of very rapid urbanisation. In other 
words, the changing in the partisan offer at a national level explains the growing presence of this 
resource, more than would an analysis based on the continuance of religious supporters. This is 
confirmed in the case of the ANAP and the DYP, by the fact that these parties do not achieve results 
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above their national average in the administrative department and, more importantly, there is no 
striking stability of the electorate. 
Table 6: resources by terms of office and by party (1987-2002) 
1987 Number of Deputies   Property resources Political resources Charismatic resources 
ANAP 3 1 3 0 
DYP 1 1 1 1 
SHP 4 0 1 0 
1991   Property resources Political resources Charismatic resources 
ANAP   0 0 0 
DYP 1 1 1 1 
SHP 7 0 7 0 
1995   Property resources Political resources Charismatic resources 
ANAP 3 0 1 1 
DYP 2 0 2 1 
RP/FP5 0 3 2 
1999   Property resources Political resources Charismatic resources 
ANAP 2 0 2 2 
DYP 4 0 3 1 
RP/FP4 0 4 2 
2002   Property resources Political resources Charismatic resources 
AKP 8 0 8 1 
CHP 2 1 2 0 
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Table 7: resources by party and by legislature (1987-2002) 
ANAP No. DeputiesProperty resources
Property 
resources 
% Political Political %CharismaticCharismatic %
1987 3 1 33% 3 100% 0 0% 
1991 0 0  0  0  
1995 3 0 0% 1 33% 1 33% 
1999 2 0 0% 2 100% 2 100% 
2002 0 0 ! 0  0 ! 
DYP No. DeputiesLand Land % Political Political %CharismaticCharismatic %
1987 1 1 100% 1 100% 1 100% 
1991 1 1 100% 1 100% 1 100% 
1995 2 0 0% 2 100% 1 50% 
1999 4 0 0% 3 75% 1 25% 
2002 0 0  0  0  
SHP No. DeputiesLand Land % Political Political %CharismaticCharismatic %
1987 4 0 0% 1 25% 0 0% 
1991 7 0 0% 7 100% 0 0% 
RP/FPNo. DeputiesLand Land % Political Political %CharismaticCharismatic %
1995 5 0 0% 3 60% 2 40% 
1999 4 0 0% 4 100% 2 50% 
AKP No. DeputiesLand Land % Political Political %CharismaticCharismatic %
2002 8 0 0% 8 100% 1 13% 
 
IV Institutional regulations and resources  
[41] The institutional regulations are not neutral; they have structural effects, often complex 
and unexpected. In this way, the threshold of 10%21 does not discourage voters to vote for parties 
whom they know, however, will not be represented in Parliament. If we attempt to extend the 
institutional rules to include certain informal practices, the impact on resources can be seen. 
[42] The attitude of institution is one specificity of this administrative department, though this 
engenders a discussion of the whole of South-Eastern Turkey. The administration at Diyarbakır has 
always been political, perhaps more than elsewhere. For a number of years, the administrative 
department has been subject to ‘states of exception’ (a state of emergency or military rule) until the 
1940s and also from 1980 until 2002. During these periods, judicial regulations were suspended, the 
organising of meetings prohibited etc. After 1980, the conditions of political activity differ from the rest 
                                                 
21 A party which does not obtain 10% at national level is not represented in Parliament. 
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of the country, notably due to political violence. The assassination of certain candidates at the 
elections, and the pressure exerted on voters by the government took place principally between 1983 
and 1999. The police force and the deputy prefects (kaymakam) are put to the voters – principally in 
the rural areas – to forbid them to vote for Kurdist candidates, but without giving instructions to vote 
for one party in particular. The removal of the social security card (yeşil kart), the end of agricultural 
subsidies, the absence of works on infrastructure, and electrification were the key threats made by 
the official representatives. In the district of Çinar for example, the deputy prefect confiscated many 
hundreds of social security cards after the elections of 1995 in the area of Eski Mahalle, as 
inhabitants there voted almost unanimously for the HADEP22.  
 
Illegitimate resources 
[43] Two resources are particularly prone to illegitimacy: political resources linked to a 
Kurdish militant agreement or those linked to religious charisma. Political parties belonging to the 
Kurdist and Islamic fronts were wound up even if the group reformed under another name. In the 
case of the Islamic movement, the prohibition of Fazilet party provoked a split in the Islamic front and 
finally the marginalisation of its most radical wing. 
[44] Following the coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980, many deputies were isolated from political 
life. Before 1960, six deputies were imprisoned and the deputy of the TİP elected in 1965 was subject 
to constant pressure. The deputies of the SHP were imprisoned after the elections of 1991 accused 
of separatism for having spoken Kurdish during the pledging of oaths. Moreover, three applications to 
stand for election were rejected after 1980 by a decision of the High-Electoral Commission (Yüksek 
Seçim Kurulu). The ANAP application of a former judge was refused in 1983, accused also of Kurdish 
separatism. The application of a civil servant, accused of being a reactionary (irtica), was invalidated 
in 1983. Finally, a Kurdist activist was prohibited from the 2002 election for having participated in the 
HADEP before its closure.  
[45] Moreover, the disappearance of religious charisma after the coups of 1960 and 1980 
shows the illegitimacy of these resources for certain State institutions, which apply pressure directly 
                                                 
22 Those concerned put their demands (dilekçe) to the government and finally the cards were reinstated under 
the new government in 2002. The career of the deputy prefect continued unaffected. 
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or indirectly on the parties. This also explains the absence of all candidates belonging to a 
charismatic family before the introduction of a multiparty system. We see again the effects of the 
revolts of 1920 and 1930, where the şeyh played a central role, notably in the revolt of şeyh Said in 
1925. 
 
The institutional splits 
[46] The effect of splits in the partisan system – the introduction of a multiparty system and 
coups - is observable notably in the renewal of personal policy (elected representatives and 
candidates) and the resources at their disposal. The capacity of the institutions to regularly reformat 
the political system is unrivalled in other competing systems. In this way, in the history of republican 
Turkey, 1950 saw the introduction of the multiparty system, 1960 saw the prohibition of the DP and 
1980 the prohibition of all parties. 1971 did not lead to a significant modification of the partisan offer, 
but the effects were important in the long-term, notably with the prohibition of the TİP allowing the 
formation of Kurdist nationalist movements.  
Graphic 4: sitting re-elected representatives and cumulative re-elective representatives (1920-
2002) 
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[47] A clear relationship between re-election rates and the stabilisation of the partisan system 
can be established. In general, the rate of renewal is around 50% past the effect of reorganisation. 
The rate of re-election casts doubt on this approach, but the curve remains sensitively identical. The 
elections of 1983 fall outside the norm because the offer is extremely controlled by the military, 
meaning it is difficult to analyse from the point of view of resources. 
[48] The other important point concerns the variety of resources. A significant negative 
correlation between the eşraf resource and the rate of re-election can be seen (-1, -0,49, - 0,93 
according to the periods) and also between the number of ağa and the rate of re-election (-0,81, -
0,85, -0,95). In more simpler terms, at the point of a split, as the rate of re-election drastically falls, we 
can note a significant increase in certain non-partisan resources. On the contrary however, hereditary 
resources decrease in line with re-elections. Furthermore, there exists a positive correlation between 
political capital and re-election (0,87, 0,93, 0,68) which is not solely explained by the fact that the re-
elected representatives by definition possess political capital at the second election. Even if the coup 
of 1971 was not considered a split, we note a slow decrease in the number of re-elected 
representatives after the coup of 1971 (Graphic 4) and a high percentage of property-holdings 
resources (Graphic 6), corresponding to the general view. 













Total period 0,00 -0.03 -0.10 0.70 -0.09 -0.08 
1920-1946 0.03   -0.1     -0.42 
1950-1957 -1.00 -0.92 -0.81 0.87 -0.87 -0.97 
1961-1977 -0.49 0.60 -0.85 0.93 -0.57 -0.32 




1950 to 1977       -0.76     
Note: the correlations of Table 8 are calculated from the series stated in Table 1. 
[49] How can we justify these correlations? A split seems to disorganise parties and devalue 
their political resources, which in doing so, enables at least the selection of one candidate from a 
party. New parties do not have candidates from within the party machinery at their disposal, and are 
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therefore more open to local recruitment strategies with candidates benefiting from resources 
mobilising the voters directly. In periods of stability, parties tend to create partisan resources. The 
transformation of non-partisan resources becomes more difficult. The political field becomes more 
autonomous from the point of view of resources when the political system is institutionally stable. Re-
elections therefore increase, personal policy becomes professionalized and certain parties put 
activists forward as candidates. Furthermore, hereditary resources tend to decrease.  
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Graphic 6: Cumulative elected representatives and property resources 
 
 
Resources and balloting methods 
[50] The balloting method is the second institutional aspect modifying the resources of the 
deputies. The rules have frequently changed since 1950, (Massicard 2002), but there is difficulty in 
measuring their effect. The distribution of the remains at a national level has perhaps favoured a 
penetration of central State machinery in the nomination of candidates, but the changing system in 
the 1980s has not led to an opposing movement of re-localisation. Furthermore, the changing 
relations between deputies and voters cannot be discussed in simple terms using the material at our 
disposal, (see Yasushi in this number). Moreover, in 1987 and 1991, the administrative department 
was split into two constituencies with two lists of candidates. It has been difficult for us to isolate the 
particular influence of this change because of its short length (two terms of office) in a period of 
radical restructuring of politics after the great split of 1980. 
[51] More precisely, the threshold of 10% in place since 1987 has an extremely strong effect 
in this administrative department. The block renders it necessary to make a radical distinction 
between the capacity of candidates to mobilise the voters and the election. In effect, since the 
emergence of a Kurdish party, fifty per cent of voters are essentially eliminated without the voters 
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appearing to be aware of the matter of a useful vote. The consequences of the block were particularly 
remarkable in the elections of 2002. The AKP wins 8 seats out of 10 with 16% of the vote and 2 
deputies go to the CHP (with 5.6% of the vote). In total, the only parties represented make up 21.6% 
of the vote. A progressive decrease in the number of voters represented in Parliament can therefore 
be established. Furthermore, this fact does not bode well with a political vision, which principally 
would be an exchange of services at an individual level where the deputy has a privileged status 
(Massicard in this volume).  
Table 9: useful votes (1983-2002) 
 Population in 
billions 
Voters and % of 
the population 
Valid votes and 
rate of 
participation  
Useful votes (parties and % 
of the vote) 
1983 860 239 802 (27.9%) 198 232 (82.7%) ANAP HP MDP 
32.7+42+25.3=100 
1987 986 342 646 (34.8%) 311 979 (91%) ANAP, DYP, SHP 
22,9+13,3+25,5= 61.7 
1991 1 113 406 477 (36.5%) 315 964 (77.7%) DYP, SHP,  
20+49.9= 69.9 
1995 1219 449 962 (36.9%) 342 820 (76.2%) ANAP, DYP, RP 
13.8+10.6 + 18.8= 43.2 
1999 1327 546 772 (41.2%) 434 201 (79.4%) ANAP, DYP, FP, DSP 
11.1+11.3+14.6+5= 42 
2002 1 407 615 103 (43.7%) 437 595 (71.1%) AKP CHP 
16+5.9 = 21.9 % 
[52] Without the block, would the deputies who would have been elected have had the same 
resources? To provide an answer to this question, we will consider the elections of 1999 and 2002 
using the profiles of the candidates. In Table 10, we have indicated in brackets the figures without 
taking into account the block of 10% (with a voting method necessitating a majority in a voting round 
for example). We put forward the hypothesis that the result of the Kurdist parties would not be lower 
had there been a conception of a useful vote.  
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Table 10: variety of resources according to the block of 10%23 





Charisma Property Political resources  Professional 
notoriety 
1995 10 1 (0) 4 (0) 2 (0) 6 (10) 1 (0) 
1999 11 0 (0) 5 (0) 1 (0) 10 (10) 1 (0) 
2002 10 0 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 10 (10) 2 (0) 
Note: the figures in brackets indicate the resources without the block. 
[53] Without the block, the deputies elected would be deprived of all resources apart from 
those relating to the party. Moreover, in the elections of 2002, the resources of the deputies would 
have been largely the same, because of the domination of the AKP, which essentially recruits 




[54] Several conclusions can be drawn from these analyses. Firstly, resources have a local 
value. In this sense, ethnicity is here redundant though a key resource in the administrative 
department of Mardin or Erzurum. From this, how can we articulate the question of resources at a 
national level? A comparative strategy between several administrative departments can be 
considered in order to analyse typical profiles of the administrative department according to the 
resources mobilised for the elections.  
[55] Secondly, the evolution of resources can be explained by mechanisms partly outside the 
political field (mechanization, urbanisation), and in part inside (institutional regulations, partisan 
capital). Splits have the effect of decreasing the boundaries of the field and the value of non-partisan 
resources in the period immediately after the splits. Periods of political tension are those where the 
autonomy of the political spectrum is the strongest when considering political resources (end of the 
1950s and 1970s), while those periods after the splits exist where the political field is the least 
autonomous.  
                                                 
23 We have indicated in brackets the results without taking the block into account with the same results for all 
parties. 
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[56] Thirdly, partisan resources are progressively to the detriment of others. In this 
administrative department at least, the mobilisation of voters is a matter of partisan State machinery 
and no longer of local notoriety. The growing importance of re-elections in cases of stabilisation of the 
partisan system indicates a logic of specialisation leading to the autonomisation of the political field.  
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Appendix  
Methodology : the constitution and encoding of the corpus 
[57] Our corpus is made up of 163 elected deputies (one in the by-elections of 1968). For 
each deputy, we have looked to evaluate which resources had been mobilised for its election by 
using the information available to us. We do not claim to have provided a complete table of all 
resources, but merely an analysis of those most significant. Certain elected representatives form a 
social capital by participating in associations, notably sporting and hunting associations, two passions 
well represented locally. Because this concerns a small number of deputies, this is not significant as 
these deputies always have access to other resources, therefore we have not created an ‘associative 
resource’. In some cases, after 1980, candidates can buy a place in office, but these cases are too 
few to be considered separately. Moreover, we refer to non-partisan resources more than to non-
political resources. The possession of property is a non-partisan resource, though historically linked 
to the State. Finally, 14 deputies out of 114 (12%) in the period of a multiparty system, do not have 
resources corresponding to our categories. We are concerned with deputies who have been elected 
unexpectedly (in a position a priori not eligible for office) (1 or 2 cases), those who have ‘bought’ their 
application (2 or 3 cases) or elected in 1983 (that is to say, invited to put themselves forward as 
candidates by the military regime) (7 cases). Furthermore, the data before 1946 being more sporadic, 
we are able only to use them selectively. The profiles of the deputies who did not originate from the 
administrative department are often not very precise, but we can however consider that they do not 
hold a local establishment (property resources and professional notoriety in particular). 
[58] The necessity for a code for statistical purposes has the effect here of labelling in a 
binary manner (yes/no) a given resource to an elected candidate, even though a sliding scale can be 
seen. The transition from continuous to discontinuous is therefore a little arbitrary which varies 
according to the types of resources. Belonging a şeyh or eşraf family is mainly a consensus view, so 
the trend of these two resources does not pose a problem of encoding. On the other hand, the 
situation is more complex in the case of the ağa since property possession must be accompanied by 
specific instances of patronage. For the resource of professional reputation, simple exercising the 
profession is not enough. After the change to the multiparty system, in 1950, out of 114 deputies, we 
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see 23 lawyers and 17 doctors. However, only 30 deputies have a social capital linked to their 
reputation (17 lawyers and 12 doctors). In 10 cases, the effect of being a professional is negligible as 
these deputies do not come from the region, but have been nominated by the centre. Similarly, the 
military doctors from the single-party period do not mobilise the same resources as doctors with local 
patronage, a fact which has made us not take them into account. The most difficult question is that of 
partisan resources, from the moment that these must be appreciated at the time of the first election, 
the initial situation is often covered by subsequent evolutions in the case of re-election. Because it is 
difficult to precisely define these transformations in a relatively significant sample, we have 
introduced a sole dynamic aspect by systematically attributing a partisan capital to re-elected 
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AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Party for Justice and Development 
ANAP: Anavatan Partisi, Mother Country Party 
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, People’s Republican Party, the Turkish member of the International 
socialist 
DEHAP: Demokratik Halk Partisi, People’s Democratic Party 
DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi, Party for the Just Direction 
DSP: Demokratik Sol Partisi, Party for the Democratic Left 
EMEP: Emeğin Partisi, Labour Party 
GP: Genç Parti, Youth Party 
MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party 
ÖDP: Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, Liberty and Solidarity Party 
SHP: Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Populist Social-democratic Party 
SODEP: Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, Party for Social Democracy 
T İ P: Türkiye İşçi Partisi, Turkish Worker Party  
YDP: Yeniden Doğuş Partisi, Renaissance Party 
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